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In the midst of the divisive 1898 election, the Rev Isaac Wauchope lamented the 
spread of "racialM politics and Xhosa-Mfengu conflict. 
When years ago it was feared that there would one day 
be a general rising of Native tribes against the 
Government, there were not lacking those among 
Europeans who preached that it was a sin for Fingoes 
to have intercourse of any kind with those of Kafir 
(i.e., Xhosa) extraction. I know a minister who was 
very reluctant to join a Kafir and Fingoe in marriage, 
stated that it was politically undesirable that such 
unions should take place. The enslavement of Fingoes 
by Kafirs was made too much of ... it took a long time 
before Kafirs could distinguish between the Gospel of 
Salvation and the Gospel of Cape Politics. It was 
fortunate that the two races are of the same colour 
and speak the same language; otherwise we would not 
be worshipping God under the same roof now. Still the 
seeds sown in a moment of weakness are still seen in 
the case of splits in Native Conqegations where the 
line of cleavage is a racial one. 
In fact, willingness to worship God under the sye roof was declining. This ethnic 
conflict (mostly Xhosa and Thembu versus Mfengu ) after 1890 contrasts sharply with 
the 1870s and '80s; the easy, amicable relations among the school elite and tgeir 
enthusiastic participation together in so many associations ara very striking. 
This relative absence of the more or less endemic factionalism in this century 
means that we have to analyse what happened, and not see the conflict simply as a 
projection of the past. 
\ 
The intrusion of factionalism into political behaviour among the ~schoolv 
elite has been noted and analysed, especially by Andre Odendaal. Wauchope linked 
this with conflict in the churches. Indeed, some episodes in the churches indicate 
that the entire school community, not just the elite, was disrupted by factionalism. 
Moreover, the conflict was not simply an extension of elite relations; it was as 
much a "bottom-upH phenomenon. The churches most affected by the factionalism were 
the Congregational Union of South Africa (CUSA) and the Synod of Kaffraria (the Free 
Church of S otland mission which was the core for the Bantu Presbyterian Church in S the 1920s). Compared with more centralized churches (e.g., the Wesleyan Methodists 
and the Anglicans) where white control permeated, there was extensive congregational 
autonomy. Africans gained at least some voice in decision-making, but were also 
vulnerable to general trends and feelings; increased resentment and conflict in the 
wschoollt community emerged symptomatically in disputes over church politics and 
properties. This paper will examine some of these episodes before returning to more 
general observations. 
A prime example was the disruption of the Synod of Kaffraria in 1898 when 
P J Mzimba and followers seceded to form the Presbyterian Church of Africa (PCA). 
It is well known that the secessionists of the PCA were almost entirely Mfengu.   he 
secession was preceded by three or four years of growing Xhosa-Mfengu conflict in 
the Lovedale Native Congregation; this church, which was separate from the 
institution, served Africans living in and around Alice and was pastored by Mzimba. 
Ostensibly, the dispute was about the site for a new central church building: the 
members at Lovedale had already purchased the land, but the outstation people 
objected to the location. Most Lovedale members were Xhosa while those at the 
outstations were Mfengu. The elders and deacons at Lovedale felt betrayed when 
Mzimba gave his support to the outstation faction, especially when they claimed that 
outstation contributions were less than their own. 
This fact shd at least help to refute one of several 
ridiculous statements that are being circulated that 
the lovedale EafYirS are opposing their Minister 
because he is a Fingo. This too after supporting him 
for 17 years. 6 
In January 1895, John Knox Bokwe resigned as treasurer of the Lovedale 
congregation. The secession in 1898 initiated over a decade of intense conflict, 
not only in the courts but also on the personal level, as protagonist? harassed each 
other. While most secessionists were Mfengu, not all Mfengu seceded. The Rev 
Elijah Makiwane did not secede, and he was harassed as much as the Xhosa clergy. 
Nevertheless, t$e Xhosa almost certainly saw the secession and other aspects as 
Mfengu actions. 
CUSA incorporated the London Missionary society (LMS) missions. Beginning 
about 1850, the LMS began reducing financial support to its missions in the Cape 
Colony. Local members were expected to pay expenses, even the minister's salary. 
However, by the end of the century, in common with the experience of other 
"peasants" at the Cape, inhabitants of mission stations experienced serious declines 
in incomes and welfare. Church membership declined as mission residents were 
drawn/driven to the growing urban centres at the mines or ports. W&, and later 
ttEthiopianismtt, caused further haemorrhaging of church membership. Church finances 
became a critical problem; when drought or depression struck, inadequate revenue 
left unpaid salaries and other deficiencies. As a result, clergymen came into 
competition for the stations with the biggest and most reliable incomes. 
Nevertheless, self-sufficiency did mean a good deal of local autonomy and a large 
say in control of property (usually title was vested in six trustees - three chosen 
by the local congregation and three by CUSA). . 
CUSA was prey to the problems of congregational-type churches everywhere: 
generation feuds (e.g., older deacons against younger ministers), class feuds', and 
family or other cliques. In addition, whenever there was any sort of cultural or 
distinct group difference, there were more possibilities (Coloureds against 
Africans, Xhosa against Mfengu, Thembu against Mfengu, etc). Most LMS stations and 
congregations had a rather heterogeneous composition. Under the more or less kindly 
autocracy of the white missionary, Khoi-Khoi, ex-slave, Xhosa, Mfengu, etc, had co- 
existed. With the introduction of a congregational form of government, most 
stations were soon racked.by bitter politics, as noted by T Durant Philip in 1890: 
The Union has not the limited Presbyterian power of 
moderating a call to any church, much less the 
Wesleyan power of appointing a man as minister to the 
charge. And this brings into play that conflict of 
races whi threatens to make havoc of our native 
churches. ?l3 
Eventually, separate congregations had to be created for Africans and Coloureds, but 
conflict emerged among Africans as well. 
Peelton Mission (near King William's Town) was almost constantly in 
turmoil, although factionalism was intermixed with other issues. The Girls 
Institution, run by Miss Sturrock and the "Society for the Promotion of Female 
Education in the Eastt1, was a major issue. It prompted an attempt by the Deacon's 
Court to assert control in 1889 , and interventions by the CUSA executive to 
engineer a wcalltl to a white missionary each time Peelton became vacant - 1892, 
1903, 1906, and 1916. On Richard Birtvs death in 1892 and recurring thereafter, 
many members wanted an African minister, especially Birtls protege and assistant, 
Walter Rubusana. Nevertheless, Mark Wilson was called and Rubusanf2was given East 
London. A three-man committee failed to resolve divisions in 1895 ; the Rev 
Loose's appointment in 1903 (he soon left Peelton as a l1lost cause1') and Wilson's 
return in 1906 repeated the 1892 experience with rising tension, as the Rev Evans 
reported in 1906: "Our mission was a delicate one ... there was ay3amount of pent 
up feeling that made one fear it might break loose at any moment." 
By the end of 1915 all the CUSA African congregations in the area (i.e. 
East London, Peelton, and Brownlee Mission in King William's Town, each with its 
outstations) were in a turmoil. In 1913, while still a member of the Cape 
Provincial Council, Rubusana had engaged Joel Mbengo-Nyangi as his assistant at East 
London. By the end of 1915, Rubusana had been forced to appeal to the CUSA 
executive: "He has been doing everything to undermine me in Church.... The 
consequence is that he has now created a split in my church." The CUSA executive 
sided with Rubusana; they pressured and threatened Nyangi to leave the area. In 
contrast, the two local white ministers, Harperl&Brownlee Mission) and Wilson 
(Peelton), supported Nyangi and the dissidents. 
At exactly the same time, Harper was retiring from Brownlee Mission. 
Although Harper succefged in getting a vote to 'lcall" Wilson, a faction - which 
included William Siyo - objected. Claiming that the proceedings hfl been 
unconstitutional, Rup~sana intervened and declared himself consulent to the 
Brownlee dissidents. Peelton was again vacant and Wilson reported on his attempts 
to have the Rev Jones called: 
The Committee there does not seem able to make a 
suitable choice. I regret to tell you that the only 
two names mentioned in the Selection com. hay6 been 
natives viz Rubusana!! & H Mama at Lovedale. 
While personal antagonisms were present (the Wilson-Rubusana rivalry was 
24 years old), the Rev Newel1 of Port Elizabeth declared that the trouble was 
largely lfraciall'. 
The Fingoes some few years ago instituted a 'Fingo 
Dayt to celebrate their emancipation from the 
thralldom of the Kaffirs or more correctly the 
Amaxosa, the latter were not pleased at this as they 
declared that the Fingos had never been held in 
thrall; so they decided to hold a tribal festival 
once a year in honour of Ntsikana; this has been very 
thoroughly organised and a very strong branch exists 
in Port Elizabeth. It has divided families & 
Churches. I lost fifty members in a day, so I have 
had some experience of its working & baneful effects. 
The point d'apui is that on this day the Kaffir 
youths are to be warned against the evil habits of the 
Fingos. You may judge of the result if you imagine 
Englishmen at St George's banquet denouncing the Scots 
for their immorality! 
I entered into correspondence with the leaders, the 
Revs M B Rubusana & J Knox Bokwe entreating them to 
give up s p s  offensive part of the programme, but all 
in vain. 
Factionali~~ affected the huge congregation established in the Transkei by 
S P Sihlali in 1886. It was an attempt to achieve two aims: to serve Mfengu 
migrants from CUSA stations in the Cape and to satisfy a request for a white 
missionary from the Thembu chief, Mgudlwa. In spite of serious disabilities (James 
Read wrote ig21886 that Sihlali had "Kafir & Temboo element & white prejudice 
against him" ), Sihlali was successful; by 1923 the congregation (Sihlali died 
1919) was spread over 100 square miles in six magisterial district~~and had at least 
14 churches and outstations with 13 schools employing 23 teachers. Sihlali's tact 
with the Thembu and his relationship with Mgudlwa held the Thembu-Mfengu tensions in 
check for twenty years. However, in 1907, a group of Thembu elders and deacons 
began a revolt against Sihlali and the Mfengu-dominated Deacons' Court; this feud 
was to continue beyond 1945. Sihlali avoided a clash in the Deacons' Court and took 
the matter to Mgudlwa. For a while he was able to report: 
. The Chief Mgudlwa who is a Tembu is doing all in his 
power to assist me loyally, if it were not so all the 
Tembus would have followed the malcontents ... Mffudlwa 
however in consequence of his health and age (88) 
continually postponed the matter and ultimately 
advised2$hat the matter should be settled by the 
Church. 
The issue was the central church at Solomon's Vale (i.e. Mgudlwa's great 
place, Elucwecwe); this stone building was the most valuable property in the 
congregation. In Narch 1907 Sihlali persuaded the deacons that the outstations 
(mostly Mfengu) should assist in paying off the debt of the central church. Sihlali 
discovered from Chief Mgudlwa why the Thembu dissidents objected: 
(a) It was he who first asked me ... whether my 
collecting would not make the Solomon's Vale Church 
the property of the other stations. I at once told 
him that the Solomon's Vale Church as the central 
Church belonged to all my stations and that it was the 
duty of the outstations to contribute to liquidate its 
building d&t ... After my explanation he seemed 
satisfied. 
Nevertheless, in 1908, Mgudla yielded to the Thembu dissidents. The Church split 
bitterly along Thembu-Mfengu lines. 
In May the Thembu dissidents appealed to the CUSA executive.26 Sihlali's 
analysis (the fears about "Ethio 'anism'' were perhaps exaggerated) was confirmed by 
two investigations in the 1920s. 93 
The causes alleged by (the) malcontents for the steps 
they have taken are not the real- causes for their 
dissatisfaction. About one tenth of the members of my 
church are Tembus and the remainder Fingoes. There has 
been a growing feeling that the prominent men in 
Church and social matters have been Fingoes and that 
the time had come that the Tembus and other Kafir 
races should now have their turn. 
Claiming that three of the seven Nmalcontents" who signed the appeal had come over 
"from the Tile mwementtl, Sihlali asserted that "their main object is to detach 
Solomon's Vale and Beyele from the other stations ang8have a minister of their own 
nationality, and failing that to join Ethiopianismtl. 
The question of ownership was tied in an ecclesiastical and legal Gordian 
knot. The three local trustees were elected by the Mfengu majority while the 
building itself was located in Thembu territory at a distance from the Mfengu 
majority. The CUSA executive had only limited powers of intervention; it could 
mediate, but it could not impose a settlement. Neither faction was willing to 
relinquish the church to the other. From 1908 through 1910, the Thembu asked that 
the congregation be divided. The central church and two outstations in Thembu areas 
would separate and receive a Thembu or Xhosa minister. Sihlali would continue as 
minister of the Mfengu section but would move from the house and church at 
Elucwecwe. This solution (favoured by CUSA executive) was rejected by the Mfengu. 
Early in 1911, Mgudlwa sued for Sihl.alils ejection from Elucwecwe. Because the suit 
would destroy the CUSA title and leave nothing to prevent the Thembu from seceding 
to form an independent church, the executive opposed the suit successfully in 1913. 
A Thembu proposal for arbitration by the CUSA executive was rejected by Sihlali. In 
June 1913, as a compromise, William Siyo was appointed to act as minister for the 
Thembu dissidents. Siyo and the Thembu were allowed complete use of the central 
church two Sundays a month. Shortly after Siyo was disavowed by the executive in 
May 1915, Dr Rubusana w9g appointed consulent to the Thembu dissidents, a position 
he retained until 1925. 
In politics, the split among African voters and activists was precipitated 
by the polarization and realignment among whites. Although there were many 
exceptions, there was a tendency for Mfengu to follow Jabavu in supporting the South 
Africa Party (the Bond and its anti-Rhodes allies) and for Xhosa and Thembu 58 
follow the East London group at Izwe Idwmtu in supporting the Progressives. The 
rivalry intruded even on the issue of higher education. As late as July 1908, 
Rubusana, on behalf of the South African Native Congress (the East London group), 
was still promoting the rival Victoria Memorial College against the Inter-State 
College scheme for which Javabu was so active. Rubusana's objections to the latter 
scheme (opposition to denominationalism; six Europeans but only two Africans on the 
board of control; concern that, as in the past at mission institutions, Africans 
would be prepared only fgf poorly paid professions - teacher and clergy - rather 
than more l~crativ9~ones ) were shared by Jabavu, but 45 was the project most 
likely to succeed. Rivalry with Jabavu loomed large. 
Was the factionalism primarily a legacy of feelings from the wars of 
conquest? Certainly, by allying with the whites, the Mfengu had received part of 
the land and cattle confiscated from the Xhosa resisters, but there are problems 
accepting this an an adequate explanation. t'Schwllt Xhosa usually remained neutral 
in the wars and retained much of their land. The Mfengu were not alone in allying 
themselves with the whites. Ngqika allied himself with whites in 1818 and his 
example was followed by other Xhosa chiefs and clan heads; the Thembu made almost 
as many treaties with whites as did the Mfengu, yet Xhosa and Thembu began to 
identify with each other against the Mfengu. Also, the last war was fought only in 
1877-78, when there was little expression of factionalism among the elite. 
Were whites responsible for fomenting the conflict, as suggested by 
Wauchope above and by the Rev &G Nyovane, who accused white politicians of saying 
"bad thingsw about the Mfengu? Whites certainly tried this, but it is not a 
convincing argument; in the 1880s they had little success. In 1887, following 
annexation, the highly touted magistrate Matthew Blyth tried, without much success, 
to disrupt efforts to organize a political association among African voters in the 
Transkei. ItIts promoter is a law agent, Mr Gontshi, a Kafir, and a Gaika. He put 
it to the Fingoes - What good has a Kafir ever done for the g&ngoes?" However, he 
also accused @ and Jabavu (Mfengu) of spreading sedition. Jabavu was outraged 
during an 1888 election in King William's Town: 
Then, a foul and infamous falsehood was invented, that 
Mr Tengo-Jabavu boasted that the Fingoes would not 
vote for Mr Schermbrucker, while the Amaxhosa would. 
Mr Tengo-Jabavu has never cherished withir~~his breast 
any distinction ofrace among the Natives. 
However, the Rev Charles Pamla, an Mfengu, supported ~chermbrucker~~, and Richard 
Birt's support of Schermbrucker was probably the biggest factor in splitting the 
Peelton vote. 
While the ethnic factionalism which emerged so prothinently after 1890 
looked like and had links to older phenomena, it was really a new development. the 
school community, by definition, were those who were assimilated (to a greater or 
lesser degree) to the new economy and society introduced and imposed by whites. The 
old ethnic distinctions created fault lines, and under pressure the school community 
tended to fracture along those ethnic fault lines; but explanations must focus on 
the new pressures and tensions. Trapidols argument that it was a generation 
conflict whi@ happened to coincide with ethnic lines is a useful, but partial, 
explanation. Because they had been faster to plunge into Christianity/education, 
the Mfengu did occupy many of the limited, diminishing number of jobs available to 
newly educated, younger Xhosa in the 1890s. However, Rubusana and Bokwe were the 
same generation as Jabavu, Makiwane and Mzimba. Also, the evidence from the 
churches suggests that the conflict in the school community was not restricted to 
the elite and requires additional explanation. 
The 1890s began a long and painful "period of stress" for the school 
community and its elite. Educated into the cult of tqprogresslf at its apogee, their 
letters and writing in the 1870s and 1880s were filled with utopian expectations: 
the end of prejudice, the end of oppression, the opening of opportunity, the 
achievement of equality. While requiring time and education, they were none the 
Less inevitable. However, in common with other Africans, the school community and 
its elite suffered a catastrophic deterioration in their economic, social and 
political position after 1890. "Liberalism1' in the Cape Colony was undermined by 
racism3pd social Darwinism as well as by economic transformations, as Trapido has 
shown. In the newspapers, white politicians, editors and readers extolled the 
virtues of the northern racial policies and rejected the vnegrophilistlv policies of 
the Cape. 
The signs were unmistakeable: the franchise qualifications were raised in 
1892 and the Glen Grey Act was the opening salvo in the use of legislation to coerce 
Africans into the labour market. Opportunity also withered. The mlative economic 
position of Africans declined markedly as the wealth from minerals flowed only to 
whites (of course, not all whites shared either). Moreover, whether the earlier 
period (1860s to '80s) was a period of prosperity or simply a pause in the long-term 
deterioration, there as a stunning collapse in the real economic well-being of 
Africans after 1890.~~ The vschooL" community and elite were a major part of the 
"peasantryft, which declined and/or was destroyed. Natural disasters (cattle 
diseases and drought), war-time disruptions, post-war depression, as well as 
legislation of white governments, all contributed to the economic miseries. 
For the elite, new jobs in the economy outside farming not only failed to 
open but discrimination reduced some of the existing ones, as m documented. In 
Kimberley (22 May 1890), efforts were made to replace the African interpreter with a 
white man and (9 June 1892) to replace the letter and telegram carriers with 
"indigent" whites. Some magistrates (even in the Transkei) were excluding Africans 
from temporary employment as census-takers (16 and 30 April 1891). The employment 
of Africans by the government was attacked in Parliament (13 August 1891). 
Alan K Sogavs career provided a graphic example of rising discrimination. 
A younger son of the Rev Tiyo Soga, ALan Soga had a Scottish education and had 
passed the law examinations. After appointments as clerk and assistant Resident 
Magistrate at St Mark's in the Transkei, he was on track to become the first'African 
magistrate (10 January 1894). However, in 1895 Soga was transferred to the Lab 
Office and thus transparently diverted from establishing this career precedent. BY 
After a number of anonymous, derogatory letters from other Africans appeared in the 
local press, Benjamin Sakuba was replaced in the highly paid, prestigious position 
of court interpreter at King William's Town by a white man (6 May 1897). 
The effects of economic privation in increasing the level of tension in 
the churches is clear. CUSA and the Synod of Kaffraria were the denominations most 
heavily dependent on African contributions. The position in the Congregational Union 
was particularly difficult and promoted strong competition. In the Synod of 
Kaffraria, the salaries of the white missionaries and some other expenses were paid 
from Scotland,'but the salaries of African clergy were raised locally. In 1907 and 
1908, because of declining receipts from Africans, all grants to evangelists were 
cut off (thus throwing a number of men int~~~employment), and African-ordained 
clergy salaries were reduced from 80 to 75. The Rev C J Dambuzals response to the 
declining revenues of the Synod Fund reveals how irritation was raised by the 
problems : 
As long as some men are paid from Scotland & worse 
still they occupy the congregations that ought to be 
supporting Native pastors ... The Synod Fund will 
continue to fall because we are starving & they are 
alright & so they do not trouble themselves to lay the 
matter seriously before the Congregations. 3 
While there may have been mutual reinforcement occurring in that 
factionalism in the churches intensified conflict in politics, and vice versa, both 
seem to arise from the same underlying stresses. The factionalism should not be 
exaggerated, as Africans continued to find it necessary and possible to co-operate: 
most Africans supported the Inter-State College scheme; Jabavu joined Rubusana and 
the other delegates to London to protest the South Africa Act. However, it should 
not be ignored either. There were many factors in the debacle of the 1914 Tembuland 
election, when Jabavu stood against Rubusana for the Provincial Council and ensured 
his defeat, but for a decade and half the dragon's teeth of factionalism had been 
growing. What role did Sihlali, active in elections and political issues since the 
18808, have in the 1914 election? Sihlali was moderate and patient, but in 1914 he 
had to turn his church over to Rubusana's associate, William Siyo, two Sundays each 
month. 
Little has appeared in the literature on Ntsikana Day or Fingo Day. 
Regarding Ntsikana Day, a modern informant, perhaps ingenuously, insisted that its 
purpose had been "the Unification of All Black Races into Christendom9', with 
membership open to ''All Black Races of Southern Africa Irrespective of Tribal 
Affiliationstt. However, he added: "To the Xhosa Nation, Ntsikana's Memorial 
Celebration is founded on the same National Ideology as St George's Day to the 
English Nation, Saint Patria's Day to the Irish Nation, St Andrew's Day to the 
Scottish Nation, etc, etc." 
4$fter recognition as a school holiday in 1907, Fingo Day was celebrated 
formally. In an effort to mollify the Xhosa, the Peddie committee passed the 
following resolution in 1908 (probably with minimal effect): 
The observing of this day as a holiday by the Fingoes 
is in no way antagonistic to the other nationalities, 
whose friendly relations this meeting wishes very much 
to retain, and to whom they are indebted for their 
kindnesses and rescue fr~m~gtarvation prior to 
becoming British subjects. 
The enthusiastic response to a 1910 proposal to publish a history of the Mfengu 
revealed a strong sense of identity and cohesiaq, The twenty-six district 
organisers were a l1Who's Who" of Mfengu elite. 
The rival celebrations lasted from the 1900s into the 1970s at least. The 
effect was that factionalism was institutionalized and the conflict perpetuated. 
The legacy continues and thedantustan policies of the National Party regime exploit 
and foster the factionalism. 
I Imvo, 19 August 1898. 
Today all are considered Xhosa as the Xhosa language has become dominant; 
regional variations and dialects, which had never been great, are all being 
affected by western and urban influences; mingling and mass communications are 
rapidly diminishing differences. In this paper, however, Xhosa refers only to 
those chieftaincies and clans which trace their descent from the chief Xhosa and 
have been defined in the literature. See J B Peires, The House of Phalo 
(University of California h-ess, 1981); also J H Soga, The South-Eastern Bantu 
(Kraus Reprint, 19691, and Oxford History of South Africa, I (Oxford, 1969), pp 
75-130. 
See Andre Odendaal, Black Protest Politics in South Africa to 1912 (Totowa, New 
Jersey, 19841, pp 5-13. 
Terminology presents difficulties. Conflict involving the Xhosa or the Thembu 
against the Mfengu was not fftraditionalw in predating European intrusion; it 
began only after the "emancipgtion of the Fingo" in 1835 and was mainly a 
consequence of the wars of conquest. The Xhosa and the Thembu had a longer 
history of fighting and jostling each other, including being an element 
precipitating the last war in 1877-78. Yet, these"traditionalfl enemies began to 
identify with each other against the Mfengu. "Tribal" is even less applicable. 
The Mfengu were not, and never had been, a Iftribelf, although they did acquire a 
distinct identity during the nineteenth century. "Factionalism" implies new 
phenomena as well as being internecine, especially in the ltschoolll community. 
D E Burchell, "The Origins of the Bantu Presbyterian Church of South Africa", 
South African Historical Journal, IX (1977), pp 39-58. 
John Knox Bokwe, Letterbooks, I1 (1894-97), in the South African Public Library, 
Cape Town; Bokwe to Rev Don, 17 January 1895. Most of the'background of this 
dispute is from this memo and other correspondence in the Letterbook. 
It seems unlikely that Mzimba himself was concerned with what might be termed 
wMfenguismw. In the earlier conflict, he appears to have been forced to choose 
sides. After secession, he set out to broaden his church and the PCS soon 
expanded beyond the narrow Mfengu base it had in the beginning. 
R Hunt Davis - "School vs Blanket and Settler: Elijah Makiwane and the 
Leadership of the Cape School Communityv, African Affairs, Vol 78, 310 (1979), p 
26 - mentions the arson of Makiwane's house, but omits any mention of 
factionalism as a factor in Mzimba's secession. 
These hostilities were long remembered. In 1971 an informant (whose father and 
uncle had been Xhosa clergymen "persecutedM by PCA members) denounced the Mfengu 
roundly. Most of the events he was denouncing had taken place before he was 
born. 
The Inspector of Natives for Victoria East, Liefeldt, described the type of 
harassments to which PCA seceders were subjecting the Free Church members: "The 
latter (PCA members) impound the cattle of the former (Free Church members) on 
every opportunity, members of their denomination are exempt. they (FC members) 
are not allowed to water their stock at certain private holdings, nor are they 
invited to b y  festivities. Many other trifling matters have occurred that can 
not be altogether proved, such as driving stock by night into the lands of the 
members of the Free Church." Cape Archives, Native Affairs Department, NA 498, 
confidential report, 5 September 1902. 
The non-seceders, and even more the white missionaries, pressured the 
government not to recognize the PCA, and in this way prevented its clergy being 
recognized as mbrriage officers and precluded it being granted church/school 
sites. 
Christian Express, 1 August 1890, p 115. Philip was the CUSA tutor attached to 
Lovedale Theological School. 
Imvo, 12 September 1889. "The claim is simply monstrous. As well might Rev P J 
Mzimbals congregation, at Lovedale, deraand to have the management of Lovedale 
Institution entrusted to it. We must warn our Peeltan friends not to agitate 
for powers of control over an Institution that they have not the wherewithal to 
support it. It 
l2 Imvo, 19 Deceaaber 1895. 
l3 CUSA Papers, Cory Library, Rhodes University, MS 14,545, Report of Deputation 
(James Ramage and B Evans) of meeting held 25 October 1906 under cover of letter 
from Ramage to Rev Friend (7 November 1906). Also, John Harper to Rev Ritchie, 
9 April 1903; B Evans to James Ramage, 27 October 1907. 
l4 Ibid., MS 14,535 (c), Rubus- to Rev Walker, 30 December 1915. 
. 
l5 Ibid., Thomas Richard and Henry Newell, "Report of Conference at East London 
with the Revs W B Rubusana & J M NyaugiI1, 24 Febrvary 1916; there is a great 
volume of correspondence in the file. See also Brownlee Mission file, B 
14,531. 
l6 Details of Siyols career are sketchy. In 1903 he was a political agent for the 
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